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Machines and Transformations: The Past, 
Present, and Future Patentability of Software 
 
By Andrei Iancu & Peter Gratzinger∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
¶1 The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective . . . Discoveries."1  Those words were written on the cusp of the Industrial 
Revolution, when "Science and the useful Arts" probably brought to mind steam engines 
and cotton mills.  Today, the emblematic technology of our "Information Age" is the 
computer and associated software, which appears in almost every aspect of our lives.  
While some question the policy wisdom of granting "software patents,"2 few question 
that computer science falls comfortably within "science and the useful arts."  More 
controversial is whether so-called "business method patents" are the type of innovation 
contemplated by the Constitution or the Patent Act.3
¶2 On November 9, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bilski v. Kappos, 
No. 08-964, a case that has "transfixed the business community" and that commentators 
have noted has "the makings of a landmark decision in patent law."
   
4  At issue is the scope 
of the word "process" in § 101 of the Patent Act, which limits the scope of patentable 
subject matter.5
¶3 The Bilski case presents a claim on a process of hedging commodities risks, and 
does not, on its face, involve the patentability of software.  Petitioner Bilski argues that 
any "process" is within the statute so long as it has a "practical application."
  A restrictive reading of "process" could greatly limit the availability of 
"business method patents," as well as curtailing the scope of patent protection for 
information-intensive processes such as software and diagnostic methods.  Yet, software 
patents present an altogether different set of issues than business methods, and the two 
need not be addressed in the same way.  Lumping the two together creates a risk that the 
patentability of software will be unnecessarily limited. 
6
 
∗ Andrei Iancu is a partner and Peter Gratzinger is an associate at Irell & Manella LLP in Los Angeles, 
California.  The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and do not reflect the views of 
Irell & Manella LLP or any of its clients. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 See James Besson & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents (Mar. 2004), available 
at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf. 
3 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
"patents were designed to protect technological innovations, not ideas about the best way to run a 
business"). 
4 Adam Liptak, New Court Term May Give Hints to Views on Regulating Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2009, at A1. 
5 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
6 Brief for the Petitioner at 14-15, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30, 2009). 
  This 
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requirement, he argues, is sufficient to comply with the long-standing doctrine that 
excludes natural laws, mathematical principles, or abstract ideas from the scope of 
patentable subject matter.7  Bilski contends that beyond those forbidden areas Congress 
intended patentable subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by 
man."8
¶4 Bilski seeks to overturn the decision of the Federal Circuit, which held that his 
process for hedging commodity risks was non-statutory.
 
9  According to the Federal 
Circuit, the question before the Court was "whether Applicants' claim recites a 
fundamental principle and, if so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that 
fundamental principle if allowed."10  However, the Federal Circuit held that more than a 
"practical application" is required to avoid pre-emption of fundamental principles.  A 
statutory "process," according to the Federal Circuit, must be "tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus" or "transform[] a particular article into a different state or thing."11  
Bilski's process for hedging risk, according to the Federal Circuit, fails this "machine-or-
transformation" test.12
¶5 Respondent, the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"),
  While Bilski's process was not written as a software claim, the 
"machine or transformation" test on its face could also impact the patentability of 
software that, on its own, is not tied to a particular machine nor transform any particular 
article. 
13 agrees that "laws of 
thermodynamics, mathematical formulas, abstract ideas, and other phenomena of nature" 
should not be patented.14  But unlike the Federal Circuit, the PTO sees this as a separate 
and distinct inquiry from the "machine-or-transformation" test.15  The principle 
justification for the "machine-or-transformation" test, according to the PTO, is that the 
"historical meaning" of "process" demonstrates that "only technological and industrial 
processes are patent-eligible."16
¶6 Both Bilski and the PTO therefore agree that, contrary to the Federal Circuit's 
holding, the "machine-or-transformation" test is not a particularly good way to avoid 
preemption of "fundamental principles."  As discussed below, the "machine-or-
transformation" test may also not be particularly well suited to achieve the PTO's goal of 
excluding processes outside of the traditional notions of "technological" and "industrial" 
innovation.  If it performs poorly at both of its stated goals, there is a strong argument 
that the "machine-or-transformation" test should be abandoned. 
 
 
7 See id. at 17. 
8 See id. at 19 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).   
9 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
10 Id. at 954. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 964. 
13 In the Petitioner's brief, by convention, the named Respondent is John J. Doll, Acting Under Secretary 
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Acting Director of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office.  See Brief for Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30, 2009).  In the PTO's brief, 
Acting Director Doll is replaced with Director David J. Kappos.  See Brief for the Respondent, Bilski v. 
Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009).  
14 Brief for the Respondent at 34, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 16. 
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¶7 Instead of trying to protect "fundamental principles" and curtail "business methods" 
with a single test, an alternate approach could be to treat these issues separately.  For 
example, the Court could adopt Bilski's view that a "practical application" is sufficient to 
protect "fundamental principles."  And to the extent it agrees with the PTO that it was 
Congress' intent to protect only "technological and industrial processes," the Court could, 
for example, limit process patents to those whose "practical application" is technological 
or industrial, rather than those directed to the rearrangement of human, legal, or financial 
relationships.  By treating these issues separately, the Court may be able to better tailor 
the test for patentable subject matter and overcome some of the criticisms of the 
"machine-or-transformation" test. 
¶8 The "machine-or-transformation" test appears to be rooted in the view that 
computational processes are inherently more "abstract" than other types of processes.  We 
present an alternative view, that computational steps, in and of themselves, are no more 
likely to result in the unwarranted preclusion of "fundamental principles" than any other 
type of process steps.  Under this alternative view, the machine-or-transformation test 
may sweep too broadly in excluding computational processes.  This seemingly 
philosophical issue—whether computations are inherently "abstract"—could have 
significant practical implications for the patent system's openness to software patents and 
other "Information Age" innovations.  Importantly, patents that involve computational 
steps, such as software, should not generally be lumped in with business methods. 
  
A. Does the "Machine-or-Transformation Test" Identify Industrial and 
Technological Applications? 
¶9 It has been argued that the "machine-or-transformation" test is a clumsy vehicle for 
achieving the PTO's goal of limiting the patent system to industrial and technological 
applications.  Take, for instance, the infamous patent "Method of Exercising a Cat," 
which teaches a method of shining a laser pointer at a wall and "selectively redirecting 




17 Method of Exercising a Cat, U.S. Patent No. 5,422,036 col. 3 ll. 66-68 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (issued 
Aug. 22, 1995). 
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U.S. Pat. No. 5,433,036 Fig. 1 
 
¶10 Compare this process to, for example, an improved process for crawling the web.18  
As pointed out in Judge Mayer's dissent in the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski, the 
first patent involves a transformation: "the sedentary cat becomes a fit feline."19
¶11 An improved process for crawling the web might have difficulty under the 
"machine-or-transformation" test.  At best, it could satisfy the test if a general-purpose 
computer were considered a "particular machine," or if the manipulation of information 
in generic processors and memory elements were considered a "transformation."  The 
Federal Circuit explicitly declined to take a position on this issue, because the claim in 
Bilski did not recite a computer.
  Though 
it is not pointed out in Judge Mayer's dissent, it also involves a "particular machine"—the 
laser pointer.  On the other hand, an improved process for crawling the web may involve 
no particular machine-or-transformation of an article, or at least none that count, as 
discussed below.  The cat exercise method would seem to pass muster under the 
"machine-or-transformation" test, while the web crawling method might fail.  From the 
perspective of industrial and technological innovation, the "machine-or-transformation" 
test appears to achieve a backwards result. 
20
¶12 The problem with lowering the bar of the "machine-or-transformation" test in this 
way is that it becomes trivial in many contexts.  If the involvement of a general-purpose 
computer were sufficient to make a process statutory, almost any informational process 
could be statutory with careful drafting, including Bilski's process for hedging 
commodities risk.  Such a trivial version of the machine-or-transformation test is also not 
   
 
18 A web crawler is a program that automatically finds and downloads documents on the world wide 
web, thus making it possible to index and, ultimately, search the web.  See e.g., Web crawler system using 
parallel queues for queuing data sets having common address and concurrently downloading data 
associated with data set in each queue, U.S. Patent No. 6,377,984, col. 1 ll. 34-51 (filed Nov. 2, 1999) 
(issued Apr. 23, 2002). 
19 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 962 (declining to state "whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim 
to a particular machine"). 
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a very good way to restrict patent protection to "technological or industrial processes," 
should the Supreme Court choose to do so. 
¶13 The PTO's brief argues that Section 101 "should be read to incorporate the 
established understanding, reflected in historical practices and in this Court's decisions, 
that processes lacking any industrial or technological application are ineligible for patent 
protection."21
 
  Thus, if the Supreme Court determines that Congress did not intend to 
allow certain types of process patents, whether related to innovations in finance or feline 
fitness, one approach would be to simply define the scope of "industrial or technological 
applications" that Congress intended the Patent Act to protect.  Focusing on such 
"applications" may be a more direct way of implementing any Congressional policy 
objective than a litmus test for machines or transformations.  Certainly there would be 
difficult cases, but getting the arguably easy cases correct, such as the cat exercise and 
the web crawling processes, would be a promising start.  In any event, it may be that a 
test specifically directed to limiting statutory subject matter to "industrial and 
technological" applications (or any other field of innovation) would ultimately be more 
successful than a dual-purpose test that must also do the work of protecting "fundamental 
principles" from unwarranted preclusion. 
B. Does the "Machine-or-Transformation Test" Avoid Preemption of 
Fundamental Principles? 
¶14  The machine-or-transformation test has also been argued to be an overly-
restrictive means of avoiding the "preemption" of "fundamental principles."  The test 
appears to exclude, among other things, processes directed to the manipulation of 
information.  But information-based processes, including computations described using 
equations and mathematical terms, may be no more likely to unduly preempt 
"fundamental principles" than any other type of process.  In this alternate view, 
information-based processes, like any other processes, should simply be required to 
describe a useful, practical application of a principle. 
¶15 The first line of defense against the patenting of "principles" such as laws of nature 
and mathematical equations is that a "process" must describe a series of steps, or acts.  
After all, neither gravity nor the Pythagorean Theorem are, in and of themselves, a series 
of acts. 
¶16 In the 1853 case O'Reilly v. Morse, for example, the Supreme Court disallowed a 
claim by Samuel Morse for the "the use of the motive power of . . . electro-magnetism, 
however developed, for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any 
distances."22  The Court explained that "[i]f this claim can be maintained, it matters not 
by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."23
 
21 See Brief for the Respondent at 25, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
22 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). 
23 Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
  The Court worried about the 
unwarranted preemption of future inventions if such a claim were allowed: "For aught 
that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a 
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, 
without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff's 
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specification."24  The later invention might be superior, the Court continued, but "the 
inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it, without the permission of 
this patentee."25
¶17 Morse expressed the concern that the machine-or-transformation test is supposed to 
address, namely, that an overly broad claim might "preempt" all uses of a principle, 
known or unknown.  The problem with Morse's claim, however, could have been fixed 
by a description of concrete acts, rather than merely "the use" of electro-magnetism.  If 
Morse had reduced his claim to a process, the danger of preemption would have been 
avoided, and the "future inventor" would have been free to use a new and better process 
for harnessing "the motive power of electro-magnetism."   
 
¶18 This was confirmed by the Supreme Court in The Telephone Cases, which upheld 
the patentability of Alexander Graham Bell's process for converting electricity to audible 
speech.26  Bell claimed a “method of, and apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other 
sounds telegraphically, as herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in 
form to the vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, 
substantially as set forth."27
¶19 The Court distinguished Bell's specific process from Morse's overly-broad claim to 
"the use" of electro-magnetism.
   
28  The Court first conceded that it "may be that electricity 
cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech except in the way Bell has 
discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent gives him its exclusive use for that 
purpose."29  But the Court held that "that does not make his claim one for the use of 
electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is connected in his patent. It 
will, if true, show more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it will not 
invalidate his patent."30
¶20 A second line of defense against unwarranted preemption of fundamental principles 
is that the practical application of the principle, as embodied in a "particular process," 
must be useful.  Unlike the "machine-or-transformation" test, this requirement flows 
naturally from the language of Section 101 of the Patent Act, which only allows patents 
on processes that are "new and useful."
  Critically, the Court recognized that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with "preempting" all of the uses of a principle (here, the properties of electricity 
that allow it to transmit information), so long as the principle is tied to a "particular 
process" that just happens to be the only practical way to harness the principle. 
31  Brenner v. Mansen, a landmark Supreme Court 
case regarding the utility requirement, held unpatentable a process of synthesizing a 
particular steroid, because there was no definite use for the compound.32  The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that there may be plenty of "contributions to the fund of scientific 
information" that do not rise to the level of patentability, and that such basic research 




26 The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
27 Id. at 531. 
28 Id. at 535. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (emphasis added). 
31 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
32 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
33 Id. at 535-36. 
  But, according to the 
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Court, "a patent is not a hunting license.  It is not a reward for the search, but 
compensation for its successful conclusion."34  More recently, the Federal Circuit has 
confirmed that this doctrine "applies with equal force in the fields of chemistry and 
biology as well as in any scientific discipline."35
¶21  Courts have apparently concluded that the requirement that a process’s particular 
steps describe a useful, practical application of a principle is sufficient to protect the 
principles of physics and chemistry from unwarranted preclusion.  It could be argued that 
the same is true when the principle is a mathematical one.  For example, one application 
of the Pythagorean theorem, when implemented as a "process," might look like this: 
  The utility requirement ensures that a 
purely abstract or academic exercise does not qualify for patent protection. 
A method of computing the hypotenuse of a right triangle, comprising: 
(a) storing the lengths of the sides of a right triangle in a memory; 
(b) computing the square of each side; 
(c) summing the squares; and 
(d) computing the square root of the sum. 
When used in a particular process, the algorithm is already much narrower than a claim to 
"the use of the Pythagorean Theorem" generally, which would have innumerable uses 
beyond this series of computations.  The claim would likely have to be narrower still; 
however, to be considered a "useful" application of the theorem, as it stands, it is nothing 
more than a mathematical exercise. 
¶22  If these computations were part of a larger process with a useful, practical 
application, the process could well be one that does not threaten to unduly preempt a 
fundamental principle.  Furthermore, it is not apparent why the result should be different 
if the practical application involved additional steps on a computer (say, a process for 
image processing) or steps outside of a computer (say, a process for surveying).  Neither 
process would appear to violate the preemption principle set forth in Morse and in The 
Telephone Cases.  That is, future inventors would be free to come up with other uses for 
the Pythagorean Theorem, and free to come up with other ways of surveying or image 
processing. 
¶23 Moreover, if it turned out that the only way to take advantage of the usefulness of 
the Pythagorean Theorem to surveying or image processing was through the specific 
claimed method, that would "show more clearly the great importance" of the invention, 
but would arguably not make it fall outside the bounds of patent protection.36
 
34 Id. at 536. 
35 In re Fischer, 421 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
36 See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888). 
  The claim 
would not appear to be any more unduly preemptive than Alexander Graham Bell's 
patent, which the Court admitted may well be the only way to harness the motive power 
of electro-magnetism for the transmission of speech. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 254
¶24 If computational steps are no different from other types of process steps, a rule 
requiring a useful, practical application may be a superior way to avoid the undue 
preclusion of mathematical equations, abstract ideas, and other "fundamental principles" 
than the machine-or-transformation test.  Specifically, rather than excluding all 
information-based processes, the test may be better suited to discriminating between 
statutory and non-statutory informational processes.  For example, an improved method 
for crawling the web might be statutory, even though all of the steps relate to the 
manipulation of information.  On the other hand, the process for computing a hypotenuse 
described above might fail because it is a purely theoretical mathematical exercise and 
insufficiently directed to a "practical" application.  In either case, a "principle" of 
mathematics, like the fact that two sides of a right triangle determine the third, is put on 
equal footing with a "principle" of physics, like the ability of electricity to transmit 
information, and afforded no greater or lesser protection. 
 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF THE MACHINE OR TRANSFORMATION TEST 
¶25 The remainder of this Article is concerned with tracing the "machine-or-
transformation" test to its conceptual roots.  One element that appears to underlie the 
machine or transformation test is a suspicion that computational processes are more likely 
to preempt fundamental principles than other types of processes.  If this suspicion is 
unfounded, then the usefulness of the test itself is called into doubt. 
 
A. Before Benson:  The Practical Application Framework 
¶26 For many years, the "practical application" framework was successfully applied to 
distinguish natural phenomena and other "principles" from statutory patent claims.  For 
example, Morse, in its discussion of prior cases, distinguished the unpatentable principle 
that hot air promotes combustion, from the patentable machinery for harnessing that 
principle.37  As discussed above, Morse and The Telephone Cases established that the 
ability of electricity to transmit information cannot be patented, but a particular method 
for harnessing that property can be.  In Le Roy v. Tatham, the "principle" at issue was that 
lead in a semi-solid state can be welded under extreme heat and pressure.38  The Court in 
Le Roy held that this principle was not patentable but that specific machinery for welding 
lead according to this principle might be.39  In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio 
Corp., the Court held that a mathematical formula for calculating the optimal angle 
between antenna wires for directional propagation of radio waves is not patentable, but an 
antenna configured according to the formula might be.40
 
37 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 114-15 (1854) (discussing Neilson v. Harford, 151 ER 1266 
(1841)). 
38 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1853). 
39 Id. at 175. 
40 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
  Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co. held that a mixture of selected strains of bacteria for promoting nitrogen 
fixation was ineligible because the bacteria were naturally occurring, noting that the 
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question was the patentability of the bacteria themselves, not the "methods of selecting 
and testing the [desired] strains."41
 
  
B. Benson:  A Landmark Software Patent Case 
¶27 In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a landmark software patent case, Gottschalk v. 
Benson.42  In Benson, the applicant claimed a method for converting binary-coded 
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.43  Apparently uncomfortable with a 
process consisting largely of computations, the Court lumped in such processes with 
naturally-occurring phenomena as being outside the scope of patent laws.44
¶28 First, the Court declared Benson's process to be a procedure for solving a 
"mathematical problem."
 
45  Benson then discussed some of the cases noted above:  Le 
Roy, Mackay, and Funk Brothers.46
¶29 Next, the Benson Court turned to the nature of process patents.  The Court noted 
that the process at issue was so "abstract and sweeping" that the "end use" could "vary 
from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to researching the law 
books for precedents" and "be performed through any existing machinery or future-
devised machinery or without any apparatus."
  While it never said so explicitly, the discussion of 
these cases by the Benson Court implied that the claimed "mathematical" process 
represented a "principle" somehow comparable to the chemical properties of lead, the 
physics of radio waves, or naturally-occurring bacteria.  
47  Benson stated that a process step need 
not always be tied to a particular machine:  in a process step for reducing flour to a 
powder, it may be immaterial whether a hammer, a pestle, or a mill is used.48  But when a 
process claim "does not include particular machines," Benson held, "[t]ransformation and 
reduction of an article to a different state or thing" is the "clue to the patentability."49  The 
Court gave several examples where such process claims were sustained, including a 
process for manufacturing glycerine50 and a process for expanding metal.51  The Court, 
however, explicitly declined to turn this "clue" into a rule:  "We do not hold that no 
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents."52  In particular, the Court said, it is not precluding all patents for "any 
program servicing a computer."53
What we come down to in a nutshell is the following.  It is conceded that one 
may not patent an idea.  But in practical effect that would be the result if the 
  The Court then held that the claimed algorithm came 
too close to patenting "an idea":   
 
41 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
42 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
43 Id. at 64. 
44 Id. at 71-72. 
45 Id. at 65. 
46 Id. at 67-68. 
47 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68. 
48 Id. at 70 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 721 (1881)). 
51 See id. (citing Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909)). 
52 See id. at 71. 
53 Id. 
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formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in 
this case.  The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the 
judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.54
C. The Input-Output Model 
  
¶30 Benson planted the seeds of a conceptual framework that we call in this Article the 
"Input-Output" model.  As the book "PCs for Dummies" explains, "[w]hen you peel back 
all the mumbo jumbo, the computer is nothing more than a gadget that takes input and 
then modifies that input to create some form of output."55   
PCs for Dummies Fig. 1-1 
 
¶31 In Benson, however, the steps that modify the data (as well as the "digital 
computer" itself) do not count, or at least count less, in converting an idea to an 
application.  The way to give the computational process a "practical application," 
therefore, is through the inputs and outputs.   
¶32 If the input and output are abstract numbers (for example, binary-coded numerals 
and pure binary numerals), the process is not patentable.56  On the other hand, Benson 
hints that if the end use or output is limited to a specific physical process, such as the 
operation of a train, the process is less abstract and therefore more likely to be 
patentable.57  Benson also lists "verification of drivers' licenses" as a potential end use 
that might make a computational process less abstract.58  In the Input-Output model, data 
such as a driver's license number is a more concrete input or output than an undefined 
number.  To complete the picture, later cases would find that inputs tied to specific 
physical measurements make a computational process more "concrete" than processes 
where the input can be any type of data.  For example, In re Abele, discussed in greater 
detail below, found an image processing claim to be statutory when the input was defined 
as c-ray data, but not when the input was defined merely as "data."59
 
54 Id. at 71-72. 
55 DAN GOOKIN, PCS FOR DUMMIES 10 (11th ed. 2007). 
56 See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73. 
57 See id. at 68. 
58 Id. 
59 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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¶33 This sliding scale is illustrated in the figure below, where a computational process 
that converts numbers into numbers is deemed an "abstract idea," but a computational 
process that takes data representing a physical measurement and provides an output that 
is used to control machinery is most likely a statutory application of a principle.  
¶34 However, this conceptual framework is flawed because its premise is flawed.  The 
premise is that computational steps are "principles" that are inherently different from 
input or output steps.  Like bacteria or laws of physics, they are the "basic tools of 
scientific and technological work,"60 "manifestations of the laws of nature, free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none."61
Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical 
representation.  It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, 
a hole in a punched card, a mark on paper, or some other equivalent.  This ties 
the handling of information to all of the possibilities and restriction of our real 
physical world, its laws of physics and its storehouse of available parts.
  Yet the assumptions make little sense.  First, any 
information that can be used in a calculation is physical.  As Rolf Landauer, a prominent 
IBM researcher and theorist put it, 
62
Performing a calculation, whether with an abacus or with a computer, is necessarily just 




60 See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
61 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
62 Rolf Landauer, The Physical Nature of Information, in MAXWELL'S DEMON 2: ENTROPY, CLASSICAL 
AND QUANTUM INFORMATION, COMPUTING 335, 335 (Harvey S. Leff and & Andrew F. Rex, eds., 2003). 
63 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("mental processes," "processes of 
human thinking," and "systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone" are not patent-
eligible subject matter). 
  Second, there is no inherent reason to believe 







data used to  
control machinery 
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more important to "scientific and technological work" or to society in general than, for 
example, a statutory antiretroviral drug.  To the contrary, many if not most algorithms 
will be trivial in comparison.  To be sure, the principles behind certain steps in the 
process, such as addition and subtraction, are basic to scientific and technological work, 
but so are the principles of biochemistry that make a particular drug molecule effective 
against a particular target.  The principles behind a computational process, and their 
importance, should not be conflated with the process itself. 
¶35 As a policy matter, too, there are likely better ways to ensure that innovations 
which are "too important" are not unreasonably monopolized through the patent system.  
For example, Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights ("TRIPS") provides for compulsory licensing under national patent laws, 
provided that there is first an effort to reach agreement on reasonable commercial terms, 
and that the patent holder is compensated.64  In the case of emergency, such as a public 
health crisis involving HIV/AIDS, for example, there is no requirement to first attempt to 
obtain a commercial license.65
 
  Such mechanisms are arguably a more sensible and 
narrow way of regulating unwanted "preemption" than the Input-Output model. 
D. The Platonic View of Computational Steps 
¶36 With respect to concepts that should be "free to all men," the Input-Output model 
wrongly assumes that computational steps, more so than other types of processes, are 
"discovered" rather than "invented" and are, therefore, the moral birthright of mankind.  
This assumption was made explicit in the Supreme Court's next software patent case, 
Parker v. Flook, which involved a patent covering a series of computations useful for 
controlling a catalytic conversion process.66  The Supreme Court declared that "a 
scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's algorithm, reveals a 
relationship that has always existed."67
¶37 The Supreme Court appears to take the view of Edward Everett, a former President 
of Harvard University, who wrote that "[i]n the pure mathematics we contemplate 
absolute truths which existed in the divine mind before the morning stars sang together, 
and which will continue to exist there, when the last of their radiant host shall have fallen 
from heaven."
 
68  Though Flook's holding that the algorithm had "always existed"69
¶38 The view that mathematical concepts have always existed is commonly attributed 
to Plato, and we refer to it in this article as the Platonic view of mathematics.
 was a 
bit more terse, the sentiment appeared to be the same. 
70
 
64 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_ e/27-trips.pdf. 
65 See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Adopted on 
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf. 
66 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
67 Id. at 593 n.15 (emphasis added). 
68 EDWARD EVERETT, ORATIONS AND SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 514 (1870). 
69 Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15. 
70 See REUBEN HERSH, WHAT IS MATHEMATICS, REALLY? 9 (1999). 
  It may 
well be that mathematical equations such as the Pythagorean theorem have in some sense 
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"always existed."  More troubling, however, is extending the Platonic view of 
mathematics to any series of computational steps.  It is not at all clear, for example, that 
the series of computational steps required to calculate the Alternative Minimum Tax or to 
crawl the web has "always existed." 
¶39 All patents, computational or not, must satisfy the "utility" requirement—that is, 
they must work—and therefore, some "principle" is likely involved.  The biochemical 
mechanisms that make a particular compound effective against HIV are as much of a 
"truth" as a mathematical equation that may underlie some set of computations.  
Informational processes, therefore, do not seem to be inherently more "principles-based" 
than any other processes. 
¶40 While the Supreme Court compared the computational process in Benson to a 
"scientific truth,"71
¶41 In some computational processes, such as the hypothetical process for calculating 
the Alternative Minimum Tax or for an improved web crawler, it may be readily apparent 
that no fundamental principles are in danger of being preempted.  In other computational 
processes, perhaps including that in Benson, it may require more analysis or even expert 
input to determine whether the claimed series of computational steps is a practical 
application of mathematical concepts, or whether it comes uncomfortably close to 
expressing a Platonic truth.  In either case, rather than automatically discarding 
computational algorithms, a more discerning approach may be possible, where 
mathematical truths are treated with no more and no less deference than laws of physics 
and other principles. 
 an alternative view is that it applied certain mathematical principles 
(for example, comparison operations), but that the particular series of steps to convert 
BCD number representations to binary representations had not, in fact, "always existed."  
Moreover, in this alternative view, the binary translation algorithm was not a pure 
mathematical exercise, but rather had a useful, practical application in the operation of a 
computer.  If this were the case, there would have been no unwarranted preemption of 
fundamental principles if the process had been held statutory. 
 
III. FROM BENSON TO BILSKI:  THE INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL COMES FULL CIRCLE 
¶42  After Benson, the Courts became increasingly open to information-intensive 
processes, including software patents, and the Input-Output conceptual model faded.  As 
concerns grew over the excessive scope of process patents, however, the model came 
back in full strength in the Federal Circuit's Bilski decision.  The following section traces 
the decline and rebirth of the Input-Output conceptual model after Benson up to the 
Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski. 
 
A. In re Freeman (1978) 
¶43 The next landmark software process case after Benson was In re Freeman from the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.72
 
71 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
72 In re Freeman 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
  Freeman concerned a claim covering a method 
of printing or displaying characters whose meaning is partly dependent on their relative 
positions—for example, in a fraction, the numerator conventionally needs to be above the 
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denominator.  The claimed steps consisted of reading input codes and building a "tree 
structure of symbols," using a positioning algorithm to compose the symbols in their 
proper positions, and displaying the symbols.73
¶44  In Freeman, the PTO argued that the claim was nothing more than an algorithm 
followed by insufficient "post-solution activity," namely, "a fleeting display on a cathode 
ray tube."
  The claim, in effect, covered a particular 
way to perform typesetting using software. 
74  In other words, the PTO's view was that displaying abstract results on a 
monitor was not sufficient "application" in the Input-Output framework.  The Freeman 
court refused to accept this as the sole criterion.  Rather, the court reasoned that if no 
mathematical relationship is involved, there is no reason to be concerned with inputs and 
outputs.75  The court in Freeman postulated that Benson must necessarily have only been 
referring to mathematical algorithms when placing certain algorithms off limits.  The 
Freeman court reasoned that "[b]ecause every process may be characterized as a 'step by 
step procedure for accomplishing some end, a refusal to recognize that Benson was 
concerned only with mathematical algorithms leads to the absurd view that the Court was 
reading the word ‘process’ out of the statute."76
¶45 The test articulated in Freeman has two steps.  First, determine whether the claim 
directly or indirectly recites a "mathematical" algorithm.
   
77  If it does not, the claim is 
statutory.78  Even if it does contain a mathematical algorithm, however, it might still be 
statutory if it does not "wholly preempt" the algorithm.79  The second step is not well-
developed in Freeman, but is based on the Input-Output model of looking "outside" the 
computational steps in order to avoid preemption.  The Freeman court did not reach the 
second part of the test; it held that the positioning algorithm at issue did not "recite 
process steps which are themselves mathematical calculations, formulae, or equations."80  
The claims were therefore held to be statutory subject matter.81
¶46 By narrowing the forbidden computational algorithms to "mathematical" 
algorithms, Freeman appeared to narrow dramatically the type of information-intensive 
processes, such as software patents, that would be excluded under the Supreme Court's 
holding in Benson.  "Mathematical calculations," "formulae," and "equations" 
implemented in software would be off-limits to avoid unfair preemption of truths born 
before the morning the stars sang together.  Mere software algorithms, on the other hand, 
could be freely patented, regardless of "post-solution activity" or other considerations. 
 
¶47 This was perhaps a step in the right direction, but as later cases demonstrated, the 
test was unworkable and ultimately abandoned.  Distinguishing "mathematical" 
algorithms from mere information manipulation, in particular, would turn out to be a 
quixotic pursuit. 
 
73 Id. at 1240. 
74 Id. at 1246. 
75 Id. at 1245. 
76 Id. at 1246. 
77 Id. at 1245. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1246. 
81 Id. 
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B. Parker v. Flook (1978) 
¶48 Just after Freeman, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Flook.82  The patent in 
Flook described a method of updating a number called an "alarm limit."  This 
computational method was intended to be used to control the catalytic conversion of 
hydrocarbons, where a variable such as temperature exceeding an "alarm limit" signifies 
an abnormal condition.83  The claimed steps of the process were (1) measuring an 
unspecified process variable, (2) using a particular algorithm to calculate an updated 
alarm limit value, and (3) updating the alarm limit.84  The principal difference from the 
"abstract" computational algorithm in the Supreme Court's earlier software patent case, 
Benson, was that the process in Flook  was limited to a particular type of data, namely 
"any process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion 
of hydrocarbons."85
¶49 Flook made explicit the apparent assumption in Benson that computational 
processes are like laws of physics (i.e., "a relationship that has always existed").
 
86  In a 
possible nod to Freeman, Flook stated that it is using the word "algorithm" to specifically 
mean "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem."87  However, Flook 
did not provide any analysis of what separates a "mathematical" algorithm from a merely 
computational one.  Instead, Flook simply held that "[t]he only novel feature of the 
method is a mathematical formula."88
¶50 Next, Flook held that "post-solution activity" cannot transform "an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process."
  Because such relationships have "always existed," 
they cannot be patented.   
89  The Supreme Court explained that "the 
Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a 
patent application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could 
be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques."90  Because the limitation to 
catalytic conversion processes could not bring the Flook process within the Patent Act, 
the claim was held non-statutory.91
¶51 Flook embraced the holding of Benson that computational steps may represent an 
"unpatentable principle," and added the requirement that to avoid preemption of that 
principle, there must be more than mere "post-solution activity."  Simply narrowing the 
use of the Pythagorean Theorem to surveying techniques is not enough, or in the words of 




82 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
83 Id. at 585. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 593 n.15. 
87 Id. at 585 n.1 (emphasis added). 
88 Id. at 585. 
89 Id. at 590. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 596. 
92 In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
  Thus, Flook reinforced the 
Input-Output conceptual model that looks for steps outside of the computational steps to 
gauge whether the process is statutory. 
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¶52 The term "post-solution activity" in Flook can also be read to mean that the non-
computational acts must be novel.  In other words, if all of the novelty lies in the 
computational steps, the applicant should not be permitted to preclude their use by stating 
an obvious use for their output.  The dissent in Flook attacked the majority for "importing 
into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness."93
¶53 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this extension of the Input-Output model, which 
gives more weight to the inputs and outputs when they form the "point of novelty," can 
still have questionable policy implications.  Taking the Court's Pythagorean hypothetical, 
the patent would be the same and have the same preclusive effect whether the point of 
novelty was the formula, the surveying technique, or the idea to combine the two.  As for 
which type of innovation society should motivate, why reward mathematicians for 
coming up with new surveying techniques (which would result in a patentable 
combination of a new "application" for a known "principle"), but not reward surveyors 
for discovering new computational algorithms to apply to their trade (which would result 
in an unpatentable combination of a new "principle" and a known application)?  After all, 
history tells us that surveyors can be pretty good at math: the survey conducted by Carl 
Friedrich Gauss for the government of Hanover stimulated his seminal paper in 
differential geometry, Disquisitiones generales circa superficies curva (1828).
  In 
fact, as we shall see, a "point of novelty" approach never caught on. 
94
¶54 Like Benson, Flook notes that prior precedents have only recognized processes 
"tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 'different state or 
thing.'"
 
95  There is no explicit determination in Flook that the algorithm is not "tied to a 
particular apparatus" or used to "change materials to a 'different state or thing.'"  
However, this bit of dicta later served as part of the basis for formalizing the Input-
Output model as the machine-or-transformation test.96
 
 
C. In re Walter (1980) 
¶55 The next significant software process case, In re Walter, made short work of the 
Solicitor General's argument that the Supreme Court in Flook had "adopted a 'point of 
novelty' approach."97  "If this approach were to be adopted it would immeasurably 
debilitate the patent system," the CCPA pronounced.98  "We do not believe the Supreme 
Court has acted in a manner so potentially destructive."99
¶56 Instead, the CCPA picked up where it had left off by refining the two-step process 
set forth in Freeman.  Walter explained that the "common thread" running through prior 
decisions is that "a principle of nature or a scientific truth (including any mathematical 
algorithm which expresses such a principle or truth) is not the kind of discovery or 




93 Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
94 See GEORGE RASSIAS, THE MATHEMATICAL HERITAGE OF C.F. GAUSS 3 (1991). 
95 Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)). 
96 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9). 
97 618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 765. 
  The first step, as in 
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Freeman, is to detect the presence of a mathematical algorithm.101
¶57 Next, Walter refines and fleshes out the second step of the Freeman test: 
determining whether the process "wholly preempts" the mathematical algorithm.  If the 
algorithm is "mathematical," explains Walter, the "claim as a whole must be further 
analyzed."  If the algorithm "is implemented in a specific manner to define structural 
relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine 
or limit claim steps (in process claims)," it passes muster under § 101.
  If no such algorithm is 
present, no "scientific truths" are at stake.  
102  For example, if 
the end product is a "pure number," the claim likely fails the second step of the test, but if 
the invention "produces a physical thing," the claim is probably statutory.103
¶58 Walter highlights the difficulty of distinguishing "mathematical" algorithms from 
mere information manipulations.
  Under 
Walter, the test for preemption is based explicitly on the Input-Output framework. 
104  The claim at issue is a method of seismic surveying 
in which a signal is transmitted into the earth, received at geophone stations, converted to 
digital format, and then certain mathematical operations are performed on the data to 
make it useful for understanding features of the subsurface structure of the earth.105  The 
claimed computations include "computing Fourier transforms and cross-correlation 
utilizing the Cooley-Tukey algorithm as modified by Bergland."106
¶59 Walter spends no time attempting to decipher whether the series of operations is a 
"procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem," as opposed to a set of data 
manipulations that just happen to involve lots of math.  Instead, a footnote explains, "[i]t 
is sufficient to note that both the computation of Fourier transforms and the operation of 
the Cooley-Tukey algorithm are mathematical exercises or algorithms as defined by the 
Supreme Court in [Flook] and [Benson].”
 
107
¶60 Walter holds "the claims themselves are not drawn to methods of or apparatus for 
seismic prospecting; they are drawn to improved mathematical methods for interpreting 
the results of seismic prospecting."
   
108  While the claims recite "signals" as their input, the 
court found that the signals "may represent either physical quantities or abstract 
quantities; the claims do not require one or the other."109  The claim steps do not produce 
a physical thing; they merely manipulate this abstract data.  As a result, the claims are 
"classic examples of an attempt to embrace the algorithm or scientific truth itself rather 




101 Id. at 766. 
102 Id. at 767. 
103  Id. 
104 See id. at 758. 
105 See id. at 761 n.1. 
106 Id. at 761. 
107 Id. at 761 n.1.   
108 Id. at 769. 
109 Id. at 770. 
110 Id. 
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D. Diamond v. Diehr (1981) 
¶61 In 1981, the Supreme Court finally found a software patent it could live with.111  In 
Diamond v. Diehr, the claimed invention was a process for molding raw, uncured 
synthetic rubber.112  It was known in the prior art to calculate the optimal curing time 
based on temperature and other variables by means of the Arrhenius equation.113  The 
patentees characterized their contribution to the art as a process for constantly measuring 
the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a 
computer that repeatedly calculates the cure time based on the Arrhenius equation and 
signals when to open the press.114
¶62 The Supreme Court held that this process was statutory subject matter.
 
115  The 
Court stated that the claim involves the transformation of an article into a different state 
or thing, and that "[i]ndustrial processes such as this are the types which have historically 
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws."116  The Court further held that 
its conclusion "is not altered by the fact that, in several steps of the process, a 
mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used."117  According to 
the Court, the patentee did not seek to preempt the use of the Arrhenius equation, but 
rather "to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the 
other steps in their claimed process."118
¶63 The Diehr Court reiterated its holding in Flook that a "particular technological 
environment" or "insignificant post-solution activity" will not "transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process."
 
119  But, by "transforming or reducing an article to a 
different state or thing," the Supreme Court held that the claims in Diehr had crossed the 
threshold into the types of process that "patent laws were designed to protect."120  The 
Diehr Court also put to rest any possible "point of novelty" approach to § 101 analysis, 
holding that it is "inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then 
to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis."121
¶64 Different results notwithstanding, the claims at issue in Diehr and Flook were 
similar:  both concerned a computerized algorithm to monitor and control an industrial 
chemical process.  Arguably, the process in Diehr was patent-eligible and the process in 
Flook was not because Diehr named a specific physical parameter as an input 
(temperature) and a specific physical act as an output (open the press), whereas Flook had 
only named the type of data to be used as an input (a process variable used in catalytic 
conversion) and had not described what to do with the output (the updated alarm limit).   
  
¶65 Diehr is a milestone for attempting to define the threshold at which a computation-
intensive process survives the Input-Output test.  But the Input-Output conceptual model 
 
111 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  
112 Id. at 178. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 Id. at 184. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 185. 
118 Id. at 187. 
119 Id. at 191-92. 
120 Id. at 192. 
121 Id. 
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was leading to results that seemed to elevate form over substance.  If Flook had simply 
named the process variables involved in catalytic conversion, or mentioned a switch that 
was tripped at the alarm limit, his process may have been patentable. 
¶66 More importantly, Flook and Diehr may have been overly concerned that 
computational processes were more likely than other types of processes to lead to the 
preemption of fundamental truths.  An alternative approach would have been to scrutinize 
whether the information manipulation steps were mathematical exercises with no stated 
purpose, or whether they were useful, practical applications—that is, steps applied to 
solving a problem.  If the latter, as both seemed to be, perhaps they would both have been 
found statutory. 
 
E. In re Abele (1982) 
¶67 Diehr is the Supreme Court's last word to date on the scope of "process" claims 
under Section 101.  The nearly three decades of subsequent silence is perhaps one reason 
behind the eager anticipation of the Court's decision in Bilski. 
¶68 The next significant case, In re Abele, came from the U.S. Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals.122  The patent in Abele was directed to an improvement in a CAT scan 
imaging technique where artifacts on the image are eliminated through the use of a 
computerized algorithm.123
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps of 
calculating the difference between the local value of the data at a data point in the 
field and the average value of the data in a region of the field which surrounds 
said point for each point in said field, and 
displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray scale at a point in a 
picture which corresponds to said data point. 
  The Abele court focused on the broad process claim 5 which 
it found to fall outside of the statutory subject matter of § 101, and a narrower dependent 
claim 6 which was held patent-eligible: 
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray attenuation data produced in 
a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner.124
The court applied the two-step test developed in Freeman and Walter.  As in Walter, it 
did not dwell long on step one, namely, whether the claim recites a "mathematical" 
algorithm.
  
125  Abele noted that each of the claims requires "calculating" a "difference" 
and therefore "presents a mathematical formula or sequence of mathematical 
operations."126
 
122 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  
123 See id. at 904.  
124 Id. at 908. 
125 Id. at 907.  
   
126 Id.  It is worth emphasizing, once again, that a "mathematical formula" and a "sequence of 
mathematical operations" are not the same thing.  The Pythagorean theorem is a mathematical formula.  
Counting the Alternative Minimum Tax a sequence of mathematical operations (which, incidentally, 
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¶69 Abele then added a further gloss to the second step of the analysis in light of Diehr.  
According to Abele, a mathematical algorithm can be statutory if it is "applied in any 
manner to physical elements or process steps," provided that "its application is 
circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution 
activity."127  Thus, explains Abele, if the subject matter is otherwise statutory without the 
algorithm, then it is statutory with the algorithm.128
¶70 Abele applied this new gloss to Claim 5, an algorithm for processing and displaying 
undefined "data,” and Claim 6, where the "data" is limited to X-ray data.  The Abele court 
held that in Claim 5, the algorithm is "neither explicitly nor implicitly applied to any 
certain process," but rather is "directed merely to a mathematical formula."
   
129  By 
contrast, Claim 6 requires the performance of a CAT-scan, even absent the algorithm.  
Therefore, according to Abele, "production and detection cannot be considered mere 
antecedent steps to obtain values for solving the algorithm."130  The algorithm is "part of 
an overall process which is statutory," and hence, the narrower claim is allowable.131
¶71 Despite the admonition to consider the "overall process," the Input-Output 
conceptual model appears to drive the outcome in Abele, as it did in Benson, Flook and 
Diehr.  The following table summarizes the "overall process" as well as the inputs and 
outputs in each case: 
 
 
Case “Overall Process” Input Output Statutory? 
Benson data translation BCD numeral Binary numeral NO 
Flook catalytic conversion "process variable" updated alarm limit NO 
Abele (claim 5) displaying data data display NO 
Abele (claim 6) CAT scan X-ray data display for CAT scanner YES 
Diehr curing rubber temperature signal to open press YES 
 
¶72 The "overall process" inquiry does not appear to produce consistent results.  In 
particular, the "overall process" of catalytic conversion recited in the Flook patent is 
surely just as "statutory" as a CAT-scan.  Nonetheless, the claim in Flook was held non-
statutory, while Abele claim 6 was held statutory.  The simplest way to understand the 
results is to focus on inputs and outputs.  When the inputs and outputs are abstract (a 
"process variable" input and an "alarm limit" output, or generic data input and generic 
display output), the claims have generally been held non-statutory.  In contrast, when the 
inputs are concrete and tied to physical processes (a temperature input for controlling an 
industrial process, or x-ray data to be displayed in conjunction with a CAT scan), the 
claims have been held statutory. 
 
involves "calculating" a "difference.")  The former may be a "fundamental truth," but the latter is not. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 909. 
130 Id. at 908. 
131 Id. at 909. 
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¶73 Abele says that a software process for removing artifacts from an image is 
patentable, but the patentee has to describe the source of the image.  Presumably, the 
patentee would be allowed to claim as many data sources as he could think up—CAT 
scans, MRI images, images from the Hubble space telescope—and all of those claims 
would be allowable.  But claiming the process as to any image source is too broad, 
because then some fundamental truth may be preempted.  This outcome is based, once 
again, on the premise that patents on image processing are more likely to unfairly 
preclude fundamental principles than, say, patents on flour processing.  There is some 
question whether this is the correct premise for determining patentability, especially in 
the information age. 
 
F. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test (1982-1994) 
¶74 The two-step analysis of (1) determining whether a claim includes a mathematical 
algorithm, and (2) if so, whether the "overall process" is statutory, came to be known as 
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.132
Case 
  The Freeman-Walter-Abele test was applied to five 
more process claims by the CCPA and its successor, the Federal Circuit, before it was 
effectively abandoned.  The five cases are summarized below in table form in terms of 
the overall process, inputs, outputs, and holding: 
“Overall Process” Input Output Statutory? 
Meyer133 analysis of complex 
system 
 test results probability of function or 
malfunction 
NO 
Grams134 diagnosing abnormal 
condition 







 signal related to 
heart function 
comparison indicating 
risk of ventricular 
tachycardia 
YES 
Schrader136 auction  bids bids corresponding to a 
prevailing total price 
NO 
Warmerdam137 generating a data 
structure 
 location of medial 
axis of physical 
object 
data structure 




¶75 Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., the only one of these 
cases in which a claim was found statutory, held that the input signals and output signals 
in the claimed process were related to patient's heart function and therefore not 
"abstractions."138
 
132 See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 949, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the "Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test"). 
133 In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
134 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
135 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Carazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
136 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
137 In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
138 Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1059. 
  The remaining cases presented inputs and outputs that were apparently 
insufficiently tied to concrete physical processes.  For example, in Grams, which also 
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concerned a diagnostic process, the court noted that the "sole physical process step" is the 
performance of clinical tests to obtain data, and "[t]he specification does not bulge with 
disclosure on those tests."139  The implication appears to be that a more concretely-
defined input may have made the computational steps statutory.140
¶76 The last two cases in this series are of particular interest because they lead to the 
ultimate demise of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, based at least in part on the 
recognition that "mathematical" algorithms are very difficult to distinguish from mere 
computations.  In Schrader, the majority held that the algorithm is "similar to a class of 
well-known mathematical optimization procedures commonly applied to business 
problems called linear programming," and that a "mathematical algorithm" is therefore 
implicit in the claim.
 
141  The claim was therefore held non-statutory.142  In a footnote, 
however, the court in Schrader admitted that the definition of algorithm is "not 
universally agreed," and discusses the problems with identifying "mathematical 
algorithms."143  The dissent in Schrader argues that, in fact, no mathematical algorithm is 
claimed: "The only mathematical problem in Schrader's invention is identifying that 
combination of bids which yields the highest return, and he does not claim any particular 
procedure or formula for solving that problem . . . .  One must distinguish the answer to 
be found from the method of finding that answer.  The latter might be a mathematical 
algorithm; the former is not."144
¶77 In Warmerdam, the Federal Circuit recited the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test.
 
145  Then, citing to Schrader, the court stated, "the difficulty is that there is no clear 
agreement as to what is a 'mathematical algorithm', which makes rather dicey the 
determination of whether the claim as a whole is no more than that."146  The court 
suggested abandoning these "arbitrary definitional terms" which "deviate from those used 
in the statute," and recommended "returning to the language of the statute and the 
Supreme Court's basic principles as enunciated in Diehr."147  In its analysis of the claim, 
the Federal Circuit expressly declined to decide whether the process was a "mathematical 
algorithm."148  Instead, finding that the steps involved "nothing more than the 
manipulation of basic mathematical constructs," the Federal Circuit held that the claim 
was a non-statutory "abstract idea."149
¶78 Warmerdam and Schrader recognized the difficulties with defining "mathematical 
algorithm.”  Warmerdam did not specify what could make a process involving 
computations "concrete" as opposed to "abstract," but one interpretation is that the 
  Warmerdam did not overrule the doctrine that a 
"mathematical algorithm" indicates a non-statutory process.  But, by calling the rule 
"dicey" in its application and declining to utilize it, Warmerdam all but spelled the 
demise of the two-step Freeman-Walter-Abele test. 
 
139 Grams, 888 F.2d at 840. 
140 See id. 
141 Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 293 n.5. 
144 Id. at 296 n.1 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
145 In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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method in Warmerdam of "generating a data structure which represents the shape of a 
physical object" was too theoretical and did not sufficiently state a "practical" 
application.  Indeed, this is the direction that the Federal Circuit went in its subsequent 
landmark cases on patent eligibility. 
 
G. Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result (1994-2007) 
¶79 The same year that Warmerdam, by all appearances, discarded the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test, the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Alappat introduced a new 
formulation:  a statutory process must produce "a useful, concrete, and tangible result."150  
The claim at issue in Alappat related to a means for creating a smooth waveform display 
in a digital oscilloscope.  The claim named a "rasterizer for converting vector list data … 
to be displayed on a display" and "means" for several manipulations of that data.151  The 
Federal Circuit gave a nod to Freeman-Walter-Abele in a footnote, but did not apply it.152  
Instead, the Federal Circuit noted that many or all of the means elements in the disputed 
claim "represent circuitry elements that perform mathematical calculations," and that the 
claimed invention as a whole is "directed to a combination of interrelated elements which 
combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples into . . . data 
to be displayed on a display means."153  The Federal Circuit held that this was not "a 
disembodied mathematical concept" but rather "a specific machine to produce a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result."154
¶80 After the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street,
   
155 the presence of a "useful, 
concrete, and tangible result" effectively replaced the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  The 
claim at issue in State Street covered "a data processing system for managing a financial 
services configuration of a portfolio."156  Written in means-plus-function terms to cover a 
computer system, the claim effectively covered a computer and software used for 
maintaining the accounts of a particular type of pooled mutual fund arrangement.157  The 
Court held that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has "little, if any, applicability" in light of 
subsequent cases.158  Under Benson, the Federal Circuit explained, the presence of an 
algorithm "may have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory subject matter."159  After 
Diehr and Alappat, however, the Federal Circuit reasoned that "the mere fact that a 
claimed invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, outputting numbers, 
and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render it nonstatutory subject matter, 
unless, of course, its operation does not produce a 'useful, concrete and tangible 
result.'"160
 
150 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
151 Id. at 1537. 
152 See id. at 1543 n.21. 
153 Id. at 1544. 
154 Id.  
155 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
156 Id. at 1371. 
157 See id. at 1371-72. 
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¶81 Because the claim in State Street was "directed to a machine programmed with the 
[accounting] software," and produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible result," the 
Federal Circuit found that it claimed statutory subject matter.  The Federal Circuit stated 
that this was sufficient to bring the process within § 101 "even if the useful result is 
expressed in numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss."161
¶82 Notably, the Federal Circuit rejected the trial court's holding that the claim was an 
unpatentable "business method."  State Street held that the trial court erred when it 
construed the claims to be directed to a process, with each "means" clause representing a 
step in that process, because in the Federal Circuit's view, there was sufficient supporting 
structure disclosed to qualify the claim as a "machine."
 
162  Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the idea that business methods are non-statutory, holding that "§101 should not 
turn on whether the claimed subject matter does 'business' as opposed to something 
else."163
¶83 The "useful, concrete, and tangible result" leaves behind the vexing problems of the 
Input-Output conceptual model, including the difficult task of identifying "mathematical" 
algorithms.  However, it allows for the patentability of any information manipulation 
process, with perhaps a trivial additional limitation that the manipulation is done on a 
computer.  It does not appear to matter whether the application of the process is scientific 
measurement (as in Alappat) or mutual fund management (as in State Street), so long as 
there is some useful application. 
 
¶84 The result was a boom in patent applications covering areas such as financial 
software and Internet-based business models, but also criticism from numerous 
commentators questioning whether business method patents are a good idea.164  For 
example, commentators questioned whether the traditional rationales for rewarding 
innovation through the patent system apply with respect to business methods, or whether 
the patent system should stray beyond inventions susceptible to industrial application.165
¶85 The logical consequence of this new scope for process claims played out in In re 
Comiskey.
 
166  In that case, certain claims relating to an arbitration process were held 
patent-ineligible because, even if they had a "practical application," they depended 
entirely on the use of "mental processes."167  By contrast, other claims that recited 
additional limitations such as "a registration module for enrolling" a person, "an 
arbitration module for incorporating arbitration language," and a "means for selecting an 
arbitrator from an arbitrator database," were found to claim patentable subject matter.168  
According to the Federal Circuit, these claims, "under the broadest reasonable 
interpretation, could require the use of a computer as part of Comiskey's arbitration 
system."169
 
161 Id. at 1375. 
162 See id. at 1371. 
163 Id. at 1377. 
164 See, e.g., David H. Hollander, The First Inventor Defense: A Limited Prior User Right Finds Its Way 
Into U.S. Patent Law, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 37, 73 n.122 (collecting criticism of business method patents). 
165 See id. at 78. 
166 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), vacated, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
167 Id. at 1379. 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
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¶86 In re Comiskey appears to have presented the lowest bar yet to statutory subject 
matter for processes involving the manipulation of information—so long as the steps had 
a practical application and "could" be performed in a computer, they were statutory.  The 
Federal Circuit seemed to believe that any problems caused by its expansive approach in 
Comiskey could be solved through traditional patentability requirements such as 
obviousness.170  The court noted that "[t]he routine addition of modern electronics to an 
otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness."171
¶87 Perhaps obviousness will present an alternative path to address the patentability of 
claims involving algorithms and the like.
   
172
 
  Yet this effectively bypasses most "subject 
matter" analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
H. In re Bilski (2008) 
¶88 The Federal Circuit's Bilski decision was apparently intended to rein in some of the 
broad scope of State Street and Comiskey.  Bilski's claims cover a method for managing 
risk of commodity costs.  Claim 1 of Bilski's patent includes steps of "identifying market 
participants" and "initiating a series of transactions" among "commodity providers," 
"consumers of said commodity," and "market participants for said commodity."173  
Claim 1 does not include any explicit calculation steps, but implicitly requires a 
calculation of price terms: a first rate "based on historical averages," and a second rate 
which must "balance[] the risk position" of the transactions.174  Claim 4, not explicitly 
discussed in the Federal Circuit's decision, includes a specific formula for calculating 
price.175
¶89 As noted above, Bilski was not a software process claim: the claimed transactions 
were not limited to operation on a computer.
 
176  Of course, modern commodities traders 
rely heavily on computers, and it is likely that the process could have been written to 
include software and/or hardware, similar to the claim in State Street.  However, because 
no "machine" was recited in Bilski's claim, the Federal Circuit decided to "leave to future 
cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the 
answers to particular questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices 
to tie a process claim to a particular machine."177
¶90 The way that the Federal Circuit decided in Bilski to curtail the broadening scope of 
process patents was by returning to a preemption analysis based on an Input-Output 
model.  After a discussion of Diehr and its precursors, the Federal Court stated that "[t]he 
question before us … is whether Applicants' claim recites a fundamental principle and, if 





170 See id. at 1380. 
171 Id.  
172 See Andrei Iancu & Jeremiah Helm, Code on Disks and Hat Tricks – Is Computer Software on a 
Medium Really Patentable?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 97 (2008).  
173  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
174 See id. 
175 See Brief for the Petitioner at 8, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 8, 2009). 
176 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950. 
177 Id. at 962. 
178 Id. at 954. 
  The answer to this question, according to Bilski, is to be found in the 
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"machine-or-transformation" test.  The Federal Circuit, as a result, held that a claim is 
statutory if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing."179  Bilski specifically repudiates the 
Freeman-Walter-Abele test because the first step, checking for the presence of the 
potentially offending "fundamental principle," looks to "individual limitations" rather 
than the claim as a whole.180
¶91 The machine-or-transformation test of In re Bilski appears to state the general test 
for any process under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  It does not explicitly eliminate any particular 
category of process, be it a business method or a software patent.  The Federal Circuit 
explicitly rejected "calls for categorical exclusions beyond those for fundamental 
principles already identified by the Supreme Court."
  In Bilski, the Federal Circuit proposes both to detect the 
presence of a "fundamental principle" and to test for preemption of that principle at the 
same time through the "machine-or-transformation" test. 
181  Instead, it reaffirmed its 
conclusion in State Street that the "so-called 'business method exception' is unlawful," 
and held that "all process claims" are "subject to the same legal requirements for 
patentability."182
¶92 Applying the machine-or-transformation test to Bilski's claim, the court held that it 
fails the transformation prong: "Purported transformations or manipulations simply of 
public or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such 
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and 
they are not representative of physical objects or substances."
 
183  As noted above, the 
claims failed the machine portion of the test because a computer was not recited.184  The 
claim was therefore found to be ineligible for patenting under § 101.185
¶93 Bilski can be seen as both a reinstatement and a refinement of the Input-Output 
model.  The refinement offered by the Federal Circuit in Bilski is that certain uses of 
inputs and outputs, even if they take place outside of the computation steps in the "real 
world," do not count to make the process more concrete.  According to the Federal 
Circuit, "while the claimed process contains physical steps (initiating, identifying), it 
does not involve transforming an article into a different state or thing."
 
186  The dissent 
argued that the "transformative" physical steps were ill-defined: "Entering into a 
transaction is a physical process: telephone calls are made, meetings are held, and market 
participants must physically execute contracts.  Market participants go from a state of not 
being in a commodity transaction to a state of being in such a transaction.  The majority, 
however, fails to explain how this sort of physical transformation is insufficient to satisfy 
its proposed patent eligibility standard."187
¶94 Perhaps a way to reconcile these views is that contract formation can be a physical 
"output" of a set of informational steps (identifying participants, calculating price terms), 




180 See id. at 959.  
181 Id. at 960. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 963. 
184 See id. at 965. 
185 Id. at 966. 
186 Id.  
187 See id. at 1009 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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output is used, for example, to control machinery.  Treating a contract as less "real" than 
a rubber press may be something of a fiction, but it allows the court to curtail the scope of 
business method patents while staying within the Input-Output framework. 
¶95 The principal problem, however, is that the Federal Circuit lumped all processes 
under the same machine-or-transformation test.  As discussed in this article, 
computational processes may not fare well under this test, because computational steps 
are regarded as "abstract" and only inputs and outputs tied to the physical world may be 
counted toward making a process "concrete."  In addition, Bilski holds that certain acts 
involving economic activity by humans (such as "initiating a transaction") are also to be 
regarded as more abstract and less transformational than, say, opening a rubber press.188
¶96 Unfortunately, the test may well be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  
Whatever the merits of various arguments regarding the patentability of business 
methods, the patentability of software processes, which are at the heart of innovation in 
our Information Age, at least deserves separate consideration.  
  
By employing what some might argue is a fiction that deems certain physical acts to be 
more "abstract" than others, the machine-or-transformation test appears to curtail 
computational (software) processes and "business methods" all in the name of protecting 
"fundamental principles."   
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
¶97 The danger of any dual-purpose device is that, like the spork, it may not be ideally 
suited to either task.189
¶98 It is not at all clear that the goal of avoiding preemption of fundamental principles 
is well-served by the machine-or-transformation test, at least in the context of 
computational processes.  For example, the typesetting algorithm in Freeman might be 
held non-statutory under the "machine-or-transformation" test, despite the Freeman 
court's recognition that it did not implicate any fundamental principles such as 
"mathematical calculations, formulae, or equations."
  There may be a similar danger in attempting to achieve too much 
with the machine-or-transformation test.  A single test based on the Input-Output 
conceptual framework may not be the best way both to protect fundamental principles 
and to potentially curtail the scope of business method patents. 
190  The claims did not recite any 
special hardware and could evidently be implemented on any general purpose computer, 
which may not pass muster under the "machine" prong (though, again, the Federal Circuit 
did not decide the question).191  And the output, "a fleeting display on a cathode ray 
tube," may not be deemed sufficiently transformative.192  Yet typesetting software, as the 
Freeman court recognized, is far removed from the Pythagorean theorem.193
¶99 Precedent suggests that a narrower test is possible.  In Freeman, for example, the 




188 Id. at 966. 
189 For an illustration of a spork, see U.S. Patent No. Des. 388,664 fig.1 (filed Dec. 9, 1996). 
190 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1246 (C.C.P.A. 1978) 
191 See id. at 1241-42. 
192 Id. at 1246. 
193 See id. (noting that the claim does not "recite process steps which are themselves mathematical 
calculations, formulae, or equations").  
194 See id. 
  As a 
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result, the "fleeting" nature of the output did not matter.195  Subsequent courts, however, 
appeared to give up on the project of distinguishing mathematical and non-mathematical 
algorithms.196
¶100 So if not all computational algorithms threaten to preempt fundamental principles, 
but the "mathematical" litmus test is unworkable, what test can take its place?  One way 
forward may be to recognize that information processes pose no greater danger of 
preempting "fundamental principles" than any other processes.  There is arguably nothing 
more "abstract" about calculating the time required to cure rubber than about opening a 
rubber press.  To jump over this conceptual threshold, it may help to visualize the 
calculation being performed with an abacus rather than a computer.  Under this view that 
puts computations on par with any other series of physical acts, so long as the 
computational process has a practical application, the fundamental principles may largely 
take care of themselves. 
  Yet a pure Input-Output test, with no attention to the specifics of the 
computational steps themselves, may not be ideally suited to the information age where a 
great deal of innovation involves computational processes. 
¶101 In other words, rather than focusing on whether algorithms are "mathematical" or 
not, it may be more feasible to focus on separating computational processes that are mere 
statements of mathematical truths, from computational processes (whether or not they 
include math) that have a "practical application."  Critically, the "practical application" 
would not necessarily require a transformation of matter, operation of a machine, or any 
other physical output.  It could include information, such as an index of web pages 
resulting from a web crawling method.  So long as a principle of nature or a scientific 
truth is not preempted, why should these processes be treated differently than any other 
process, whether or not they are a machine or they create some physical transformation?  
A renewed focus on the nature of the computational steps themselves, rather than the 
Inputs and Outputs, may better serve the purpose of protecting fundamental principles 
while allowing patent protection to keep up in the information age. 
¶102 As to the second goal—reining in business method patents—the PTO argues that 
the machine-or-transformation test is needed to implement Congress's intent that "only 
technological and industrial processes are patent-eligible."197
¶103 The question of whether and how to ban certain subject matter such as "business 
methods" is the subject of a vigorous and healthy debate.  The key point for the purposes 
of this article is that it may be better to treat this as a separate question.  If, for example, 
the Supreme Court determines that processes centering on contract formation were not 
intended to be protected by the Patent Act, such Congressional intent may be better 
served if it is implemented separately from a doctrine intended to exclude truths that 
existed "before the morning stars sang together."  As to the protection of fundamental 
principles, as argued above, a narrow test for weeding out mathematical truths, rather 
than a broad exclusion based on Inputs and Outputs, may well be sufficient to the task. 
The software baby, in other words, should not be thrown out with the business method 
bathwater. 
  Yet a method of exercising 
a cat with a laser pointer, which might pass the machine-or-transformation test, would be 
regarded by many people as outside of the "technological and industrial" sphere. 
 
195 See id. 
196 See, e.g., In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
197 Brief for the Respondent at 16, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
